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Abstract
Intuition suggests that rms with higher cash holdings are safer and should have lower credit
spreads. Yet empirically the correlation between cash and spreads is robustly positive, and higher
for lower credit ratings. This puzzling nding can be explained by the precautionary motive for
saving cash. In our model endogenously determined optimal cash reserves are positively related
to credit risk, resulting in a spurious positive correlation between cash and spreads. By contrast,
spreads are negatively related to the \exogenous" component of cash holdings independent of credit
risk factors. Similarly, although rms with higher cash reserves are less likely to default over
short horizons, longer term endogenously determined liquidity may be positively related to the
probability of default. Our empirical analysis conrms these predictions, suggesting that endogenous
precautionary savings are central to understanding the eects of cash on credit risk.
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Introduction
An important factor that may aect the probability that a distressed rm defaults on its debt payments is
the rm's holdings of cash and other liquid assets. This observation may itself feature prominently in the
levered rm's decision to retain a cash reserve, which could otherwise be invested or paid out to shareholders.
This paper studies the implications of the interaction between the possibility of default and the rm's cash
policy for our understanding of the role of liquidity in credit risk. We rst document that in cross-sectional
regressions credit spreads are positively correlated with the rm's cash holdings, even though rms with
higher cash reserves are intuitively expected to be \safer." We explain this puzzling nding in a model of a
levered rm that allows for joint determination of cash and investment policies in the presence of nancing
frictions and distress costs. The model shows that riskier rms optimally choose to hold higher cash reserves,
which results in a positive correlation between cash holdings and credit spreads. At the same time, spreads
are negatively correlated with exogenous variations in the cash holdings that are unrelated to credit risk
factors. Consistent with these predictions, in our tests the correlation between cash and spreads turns
negative when we use instrumental variables suggested by the model. We also elicit the role of liquidity in
empirical default-predicting models, once again emphasizing the crucial role that endogeneously determined
precautionary savings play in the link between cash and credit risk.
Credit risk and corporate debt pricing have been a focus of much debate for many years. Yet, even though
the holdings of cash and other liquid assets are commonly thought to aect default, few of these studies
explicitly consider the role of cash. Starting with Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), most structural
models assume that the rm defaults when the market value of its assets falls below some threshold, such
as that corresponding to zero equity price. In this framework, new equity typically can be issued at no cost
when needed, and any temporary cash ow shortfall can be overcome by raising external nancing as long
as the value of assets remains above the threshold. As a result, the rm's cash holdings are irrelevant in
this framework. Although Leland (1994), Longsta and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), Collin-
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), and other studies have extended the basic setup along many dimensions,
most of them still leave no room for an optimal cash policy in debt pricing or capital structure decision.1
It is therefore unsurprising that empirical studies of credit spreads or corporate bond returns do not look
at the role of cash holdings (see Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Eom, Helwege, and Huang
(2004), and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007)).
1Prominent exceptions include recently developed models by Acharya, Huang, Subrahmanyam and Sundaram (2006), An-
derson and Carverhill (2007), and Asvanunt, Broadie, and Sundaresan (2007), which allow for optimal cash holdings in the
presence of costly external nancing.
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In contrast to the assumption of frictionless nancing, corporate nance research argues that some rms
may have diculties raising external cash. This makes cash holdings relevant for constrained rms, and
gives rise to an optimal cash policy that depends on various factors, such as the rm's current and future
investment opportunities, although the role of the rm's capital structure and credit risk in determining its
optimal cash policy has not been explored.2 In this paper, we show how endogenous cash policy aects the
rm's credit risk.
Intuition suggests that rms with higher liquid assets should have unambiguously lower credit spreads.
Firstly, in the presence of nancing frictions higher cash holdings reduce the probability that a cash shortage
will force the rm into default despite fundamentally sound business (Davydenko (2007)). This view explains
why empirical bankruptcy-predicting models (e.g. Altman (1968), Ohlson (1974), Zmijevski (1984)) usually
include some measures of balance sheet liquidity (although, as we discuss below, not the mixed evidence
regarding the ability of these variables to predict default in such models). Second, conditional on default,
creditors' recovery rates are higher for rms with higher current assets (Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan
(2007)), as the value of such assets is better preserved in liquidation. With lower probabilities of default and
higher recovery rates conditional on default, debt of rms with substantial cash reserves should be safer and
bear lower credit spreads.
We nd that, although appealing, this simple intuition is not consistent with the data. Empirically, credit
spreads are positively, not negatively, correlated with cash holdings. The eect is robust, persistent, and
signicant both statistically and economically. Moreover, the positive correlation is higher for riskier rms,
even though for such rms the benecial role of cash in mitigating credit risk should be higher. We argue
that these ndings are due to the endogenous nature of cash holdings in levered rms. In the presence of
nancing constraints and costs of nancial distress, riskier rms may choose to maintain higher cash reserves
in order to reduce the possibility of a cash shortage in the future. Such endogenous adjustment in cash
holdings can result in a spurious positive correlation between credit spreads and equilibrium cash levels, as
both increase in the underlying credit risk. If the probability of default were to rise for exogenous reasons,
the precautionary endogenous increase in cash holdings could decrease the expected loss from default and
dampen the adverse eect that the deterioration of credit has on debt prices.
To illustrate the link between cash and credit risk, we construct a model of a levered rm with endogenous
investment and cash policy. Initially endowed with some cash reserve, the rm chooses how much of it to
2Studies of corporate cash holdings include Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
(1999), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2006),
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007).
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invest in a protable long-term project, and how much to retain a cash buer against a possible future cash
ow shortfall at the time when its debt becomes due. Future cash ows cannot be fully pledged as collateral,
implying the existence of market frictions. At the heart of the model is the idea that at least some cash ows
are contingent on the rm's ability to meet its debt obligations either from cash ows or from retained cash
holdings. Hence, the rm faces a trade-o between investing available cash in projects that will generate
cash ows in the future only if the interim debt payments are made, and retaining cash in order to reduce
the likelihood of default, increasing the probability that future benets from the investments will be realized.
This setting allows us to analyze the eect of various credit risk factors on its cash reserves, and the link
between cash, credit spreads, and the probability of default.
The model predicts that optimal cash holdings increase in factors that increase the rm's default risk. An
exogenous change in such factors aects credit risk not only directly, but also indirectly as the rm adjusts
its endogenously determined cash reserve in response. For example, if the level of debt increases exogenously,
the probability of default rises as a direct result, causing spreads to increase. At the same time, the rm also
optimally increases its cash holdings, which reduces the probability a cash shortfall when debt comes due.
Thus, the indirect eect of the debt increase is to decrease spreads due to higher cash levels. We show that
the direct eect typically dominates. As a result, riskier rms have both higher optimal cash reserves and
higher credit spreads, which causes the two to be positively correlated in the cross-section. At the same time,
\exogenous" variations in cash holdings that are unrelated to credit risk factors are negatively correlated
with spreads, as they reduce the probability of default and increase creditors' recovery conditional on default,
as the simple intuition suggests they should. The model identies future long-term investment opportunities
and managerial self-interest as potential sources of exogenous variations in cash. Taking these predictions to
the data, we nd that the positive correlation between cash and spreads is reduced in the presence of better
controls for credit risk factors, and turns negative when we use instrumental variable regressions to identify
exogenous variations in cash. Our evidence conrms that the positive correlation between cash and spreads
in cross-sectional regressions is spurious rather than causal, arising from the dependence of both variables
on rm-specic credit risk factors.
We also clarify the role of liquidity as a predictor of default. Since Altman's (1968) z-score model,
most empirical studies of default have used some controls for balance sheet liquidity. However, despite their
intuitive appeal and much to the surprise of the researchers, these controls are typically found uncorrelated or
even positively correlated with the probability of default.3 We argue that the endogeneity of liquid holdings
3In their classic papers, Ohlson (1980) and Zmijevski (1984) point out that liquidity proxies do not work as expected, but
nevertheless retain them in their models. Later studies by Begley et al. (1996), Shumway (2001), and Hillegeist et al. (2004)
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once again is playing a central role in this setting. Our model shows that higher cash holdings reduce the
probability of default in the short run, but may increase it in the long run, as the constrained rm that
reduces investment in order to conserve cash for immediate debt service increases the probability of a long-
term cash ow shortfall. Consistent with these predictions, we nd that, although liquidity is negatively
associated with the probability of default over very short horizons, for longer prediction horizons which are
the focus of much of the research in this area, the endogenously determined liquidity in our tests is positively
associated with default.
Our ndings suggest that corporate liquidity may be an important factor that aects credit risk. As
discussed previously, cash is considered irrelevant in most structural models of credit risk. Papers like Kim,
Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), and Ross (2005) model default as
driven by cash ow shortages rather than low asset values, but typically assume that the rm's cash holdings
are exogenous. Empirical models of default such as Altman (1968), Ohlson (1974), and Zmijevski (1984),
allow liquidity to play a role, but also treat it as given. Our paper shows that recognizing the endogenous
nature of cash reserves is crucial for understanding the relationship between liquidity and credit risk. To
model credit risk accurately, it may be necessary to keep track of the rm's optimal cash holdings in the
presence of nancing costs, as suggested recently by Acharya et al. (2006), Anderson and Carverhill (2007),
and Asvanunt, Broadie, and Sundaresan (2007). Our nding that both cash and leverage are positively
related to spreads suggests that cash cannot be treated as negative debt in credit risk studies.4 Finally, we
show that default risk may aect cash holdings for levered rms, contributing to the growing literature that
studies the determinants of corporate cash holdings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I documents a positive correlation between
cash holdings and credit spreads. Section II presents the model. Section III describes our data. Section
IV reports further regression analysis of spreads, cash holdings, and the probability of default. Section V
summarizes our ndings and provides a discussion of their implications. Proofs and model extensions are
given in the Appendices.
also nd that liquidity does not appear to reduce the probability of defaut.
4For another precautionary rationale for why cash may not be negative debt, see Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2004).
They focus on a hedging motive for constrained rms in substituting between cash and debt reductions, that is, to equalize
future marginal products of investment.
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I. Cash and Spreads: An Empirical Puzzle
To study the relationship between corporate bond spreads and cash holdings, we use a large sample of
monthly bond prices between 1997 and 2003 for non-nancial U.S. rms. We measure credit spreads relative
to a cash-ow matched portfolio of U.S. Treasury securities. Table I presents the results of regressions of
spreads on cash, both with and without the inclusion of controls for standard credit risk factors used in
extant empirical studies of spreads, such as leverage, volatility, debt maturity, size, and time dummies that
control for common movements in spreads.5 Each specication is estimated using three methodologies: OLS,
cross-sectional regressions that use means of each variable for each rm (CS), and Fama-MacBeth regressions
(FMB).
The eect of control variables is in line with other studies of spreads (e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev
(2007)). More levered and more volatile rms and small rms are riskier, and consequently have higher
credit spreads. Our focus, however, is on the relationship between spreads and cash, which we measure as
a proportion of the rm's total assets. Table I shows that both in univariate regressions (columns (1) to
(3)) as well as in the presence of standard credit risk controls used in the literature, the correlation between
credit spreads and cash holdings is positive and strongly statistically signicant. The economic signicance
of the implied eect is also considerable: in most regressions, a one standard deviation increase in cash/assets
corresponds to an increase in the bond spread of about 20 basis points.
[TABLE I HERE]
This evidence is counter-intuitive and puzzling. Indeed, given that higher balance sheet liquidity implies a
lower probability of default (e.g. Davydenko (2007)) and higher recovery rates for creditors conditional on
default (e.g. Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007)), spreads should be lower, not higher, for rms with
higher cash holdings. Yet the results in Table I reject this simple intuition. The positive correlation between
cash and spreads is a robust phenomenon in the data, and is also observed in other bond data sets and time
periods. Subsection IV.A shows that it is unaected by controls for industry eects, covenants, and liquidity
needs.
One might expect that, even if default triggered by a cash shortage is a distant possibility for the majority
of rms, cash holdings should be relatively more benecial for riskiest rms for which such a possibility looms
large. Hence, the correlation between cash and spreads should be more negative for riskier rms, especially
5We defer the detailed discussion of the dataset and the description of independent variables until Section III.
5Draft 23/10/2007 - 01:00 Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
given that for such rms credit risk explains more of the observed spread (Huang and Huang (2003)).
Yet once again this intuition is in conict with the data. Regressions in Table II, estimated separately
for dierent rating groups, show that not only is the correlation positive for all rating groups, but it also
increases monotonically as the rating deteriorates.6 In these regressions of spreads, the cash coecient is
17 times as high for the lowest ratings (B{CCC) as for A{rated bonds. How can the positive correlation
between cash and spreads be explained?
[TABLE II HERE]
We suggest that these ndings are due to the eect that the possibility of default is likely to have on
the levered rm's optimal cash policy. If external nancing in distress is costly or unavailable, and if default
is costly, then riskier rms may endogenously choose to hold higher cash reserves as a buer against the
possible cash ow shortfall. As a result, riskier rms may end up having not only higher credit spreads,
but also higher optimally chosen cash holdings, resulting in a spurious positive correlation between cash
and credit spreads. As a result, treating cash as an exogenous parameter in studies of credit risk may be
inadequate and yield counterfactual predictions.
The potentially ambiguous nature of the spread-cash relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, which summa-
rizes cash holdings of rms in dierent rating groups. Rather than change monotonically, cash holdings are
roughly U-shaped in the credit rating. Safe AAA and AA rms have higher than average cash holdings, low
debt levels, and are in all likelihood unconcerned about credit risk. Indeed, their high balance sheet liquidity
and low net leverage are likely to be important reasons why the rating agencies rate them so highly in the
rst place, consistent with the common wisdom that higher cash holdings make the rm safer. However,
at the other end of the spectrum, speculative-grade (junk) rms (those rated below BBB{) also have larger
than average cash holdings, and lower grades of junk generally correspond to higher cash reserves. We argue
that this pattern is due to the precautionary motive for saving cash by levered rms faced with a possibility
of default. Despite their high cash reserves, these rms are still riskier than A{ or BBB{rated rms with
lower cash reserves due to the much higher levels of debt. Indeed, even relatively high cash reserves of 5.8%
of net assets for B-rated rms pale into insignicance next to their leverage ratios in excess of 66%. As a
result of the pattern of cash holdings shown in Figure 1, cash turns out to be positively associated with
6To conserve space, henceforth we report OLS regressions only. To maintain a sucient number of rms in each rating
group, we combine rms rated AAA and AA, and also all rms rated B and below.
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spreads in the cross-section, with a stronger relationship for riskier rms.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
To show how a positive correlation between cash and credit spreads can arise under endogenous cash
policy, we rst construct a model of cash in the presence of credit risk. In the model, both debt yields and
equilibrium cash holdings increase in credit risk factors. We then present evidence that suggests that the
positive correlation between cash and spreads is spurious rather that causal, and that it is reversed when we
control for the endogeneity of cash holdings. Finally, we show how the endogeneity of cash aects the role
of liquid assets in empirical default-predicting models such as Altman's (1968) z-score.
II. The model
A. Benchmark model setup
This section develops a model of the rm's endogenous cash policy with investment uncertainty and
credit risk in the presence of costly outside nancing. Cash policy is the rm's instrument in mitigating
nancing constraints in the presence of required debt payments. Our goal is to understand the relationship
between the optimal cash levels retained by the rm and the pricing of corporate debt. We nd that if the
variation in economic factors aects credit risk only indirectly through changes in cash holdings then the
relationship between cash and credit spreads is negative. However, if there is also a direct eect (we call
this case \endogenous"), then the variation in exogenous economic factors may have two eects on credit
spreads, and the sign of the relationship between cash and credit spreads depends on which of the two eects
dominates.
Since cash is arguably a more exible instrument than debt, in the model we rst solve for the optimal
cash policy given a particular level of debt, and study the eect of changes in debt levels and other rm
characteristics on cash holdings.7 One reason why debt is more dicult to adjust than cash is the presence
of xed transactions costs of renancing. Dynamic capital structure studies (Fisher, Heinkel, and Zechner
(1989), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Strebulaev (2007)) show that waiting times to restructure debt
optimally could be very large even for small transaction costs, an implication supported by recent empirical
7The assumption of an exogenous debt level is made for simplicity. As discussed in Subsection II.E, relaxing this assumption
may strengthen or weaken our conclusions, depending on the correlation of optimal leverage with other rm characteristics.
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evidence (Leary and Roberts (2005)).8 In contrast to debt, it is easier to increase cash reserves by retaining
the current period's cash ow within the rm instead of investing it or paying it out to shareholders.9
The model features a rm in a three-period investment economy. At date 0 the rm is endowed with
some initial cash reserve, which can be invested or retained as a buer against future shortfall. It also has
assets in place of K units, which can be thought of as the value of book assets or the initial xed cost of
investment. These existing assets yield a cash ow in each period t = 0; 1; 2. We denote the period-t cash
ow as t. An important feature of the model is that the intermediate cash ow from existing assets, 1, is
stochastic and unknown at date 0. We assume that information is symmetric, so that neither investors nor
managers know the future protability of the rm. The probability distribution of 1 is described by the
density function g(1), which is common knowledge. (We discuss the assumptions regarding the properties
of this distribution in detail below). As can be easily shown, particular assumptions on the current cash
ow, 0, and on the cash ow in the last period, 2, are unimportant, and therefore without loss of generality
we assume them to be zero. Initially, the rm is endowed with an amount of cash c0, and can divide this
cash between investment and retained cash holdings.
At date 0 the rm has a protable investment opportunity, and has to choose the level of investment
I. This investment produces a certain cash ow at date 2, described by a standard increasing concave
production function f(I).10 The rm has outstanding debt at date 0, with the payment of principal B due
at date 1. The book value of debt B is xed and pre-determined, a scenario consistent, for example, with
xed costs of issuing debt. To pay its debt obligation, the rm can use its income stream at date 1 and cash
saved at date 0. In other words, future cash ows from the investment cannot be collateralized. This implies
that existing cash and that generated by the current investment are not perfect time substitutes. (We relax
this assumption in Section B.2 by introducing the possibility of partial pledgeability without aecting the
economic insights). In addition, the liquidation value of assets at date 1 is assumed to be zero, so that
investment is lost if the rm defaults on its debt. Finally, we assume for simplicity that at date 0 the rm
has exhausted its debt capacity, and therefore it must use the current cash ow and existing cash balances to
nance its investment.11 The rm's equityholders maximize the nal period return, and therefore do not pay
dividends at dates 0 and 1, an assumption made for simplicity. The risk-free rate of interest is normalized
to zero.
8Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006) allow for both xed and proportional renancing costs, which enables them to determine
the level of renancing costs that is necessary for waiting times to be non trivial.
9Alternatively, cash can be raised from external sources. However, if external nancing is costly today and equally available
in the future, rms will not want to access it solely to increase today's cash savings.
10We assume that the production function is deterministic for simplicity of exposition; our conclusions do not depend on this
assumption.
11Alternatively, it can be assumed that there are costs of issuing new debt and equity.
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Before proceeding further, it is worth discussing the setup and emphasize several crucial features of the
model. The exact specication can vary substantially without aecting the qualitative nature of conclusions,
as long as two economically intuitive conditions are met. First, external nancing cannot be raised against
the full value of future cash ows; in other words, there are nancing frictions that restrict the rm's ability
to raise cash at date 1. If the rm can pledge all of its proceeds from investment, then there is no role for
precautionary savings of cash. In reality, the condition of partial pledgeability, which we model in a reduced
form, is likely to be universally met, for example, because of asymmetry in information, liquidation costs,
and the importance of human capital. Second, some cash ows from the current investment are realized
after some portion of the outstanding debt is due. In the base-case model we assume that the investment
outcome is realized in full only at date 2. Most capital expenditure items in practice are likely to satisfy
this requirement, since they usually generate cash ows after some non-trivial debt payments must be made.
This assumption can be relaxed so that the investment can also generate a cash ow at date 1. What is
needed is a non-trivial fraction of cash ows expected at date 2, after the debt payment is due, to make
the survival at an intermediate stage a worthy option. Another way to express the same idea is to say that
default at date 1 results in a loss of value.
At date 0 the rm's managers decide how to split its cash endowment c0 between investment I and cash
reserves to be retained until date 1. Thus, its cash holdings carried over from period 0 to period 1 are given
by:
c1 = c0   I: (1)
Both the cash balance and the realization of cash ows from the assets in place in period 1, 1, are available
at date 1 for debt service. The level of nancial slack at date 1, S, can then be written as:
S = c1 + 1   B: (2)
The rm is solvent at date 1 if S is non-negative. In this case, the rm makes the required debt payment
and survives until date 2 to collect the cash ow from investment, f(I). If the rm does not have sucient
internal resources to pay its debt (S < 0), then in the benchmark model it defaults and is liquidated, and
future cash ows are lost. Thus, in period 0 the rm faces the following trade-o in deciding whether to
invest its cash or to retain it until the next period. On the one hand, higher retained cash holdings imply
lower investment, which in turn results in lower cash ows from long-term investment at date 2. On the
other hand, an increase in cash holdings reduces the probability of a cash shortage at date 1, increasing the
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probability that the rm survives until date 2 to rip the benets of the investment.
The \default boundary", or the minimum level of period-1 cash ow that triggers default, is 1;B =
B c1 = B (c0 I). Denote as max the highest possible value of the rst-period cash ow. Equityholders'
value can then be written as:
E =
Z max
1;B
[ I + (c0 + 1   B) + f(I)]g(1)d1; (3)
where the total payo to equityholders can be decomposed into the initial cash outow of I, the dierence
between the cash balance and the debt payment at date 1, and the realization of the nal cash ow, provided
that the rm does not default on its debt.
The market value of the rm's debt, D, can be written as follows:
D = B  
Z 1;B
min
[B   (c1 + 1)]g(1)d1; (4)
where min is the lowest possible value of the rst-period cash ow. The above expression can be interpreted
as the face value of debt B minus the loss L = (B   D) that creditors expect to incur in default states
[min;1;B]. Debt yield (or credit spread) at date 0 is given by:
s =
B
D
  1 =
B
(B   L)
  1: (5)
How are changes in the rm's cash holdings c1 related to changes in the credit spread s? In what
follows, to address this question it will sometimes be more convenient to look at the relationship between
cash and credit loss L, since Equation (5) shows that spreads and losses are positively related through a
monotonic transformation. We demonstrate that the nature of the relationship between expected credit loss
and variations in cash depends on whether the variation is \exogenous" and unrelated to the credit risk of
the rm, or whether it is an \endogenous" response to variations in credit risk variables that, in addition to
inducing changes in optimal cash holdings, also directly aect credit spreads.
The eect of any variable x on credit spreads can be decomposed into two components. First, the spread
may directly depend on x and, second, it may also be aected indirectly if changes in x aect optimal cash
holdings, and changes in cash result in changes in spreads. Formally,
ds
dx
=
@s
@x
+
@s
@c1

dc1
dx
: (6)
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It is easy to show that changes in the spread are negatively correlated with changes in cash holdings, so that
@s
@c1 < 0. At the same time, the direct eects of x on the spread ( @s
@x) and on cash holdings (dc1
dx ) depend on
the nature of x and can be either positive or negative. As an important special case, some variables may
aect spreads only indirectly through their eect on the chosen cash holdings, meaning that @s
@x = 0. We
refer to variations in cash induced by such variables as \exogenous", and discuss them in Subsection II.C.
For credit risk-related factors that aect spreads both directly and indirectly through their eect on the
rm's optimal cash holdings, the overall eect in Equation (6) depends on whether the two eects work in
the same direction, and if not, which of them dominates. For example, if a change in x directly increases the
expected loss from default, it may also induce a precautionary increase in cash holdings, which in turn would
reduce spreads, dampening the rst eect. The overall correlation between induced changes in spreads and
cash holdings depends on the nature of the particular underlying factor involved; below, we study a number
of such factors, starting with the level of debt.
B. Endogenous cash policy and credit spreads
In this subsection, we show that if the variation in cash holdings is due to factors that also aect the
credit risk of the rm, then the relationship between cash holdings and credit spreads may be positive if the
indirect eect (that aects credit spreads via changes in optimal cash holdings) dominates.
B.1. The eect of debt on spreads and equilibrium cash holdings
We rst look at how equilibrium investment and cash holdings depend on the rm's level of debt, B.
Managers maximize the value of equity by choosing the appropriate level of investment. From Equation (3),
their optimization problem yields the following rst order condition:
@E
@I
=
Z max
1;B
[ 1 + f0(I)]g(1)d1   [f(I) + (c0   I)   B + 1;B]g(1;B)
@1;B
@I
= 0: (7)
We can re-write (7) as12
f0(I)   1 =
f(I)g(1;B)
1   G(1;B)
; (8)
where G() is the cumulative density function associated with density g(), so that 1 G(1;B) is the probabil-
ity that the rm will be able to make the required debt payment, conditional on a given level of investment.
12It is easy to show that the second-order maximization condition is satised.
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Once the rm's investment I is chosen, the retained cash reserve is c1 = c0 I. Note that in the rst-best case
of unrestricted investment, the standard maximization solution would yield a well-known result f0(I) = 1.
The right-hand side expression in Equation (8) is positive as long as the rm's ability to repay the debt
in uncertain. Therefore, the rm's optimal investment, I, is lower than the rst-best level. The economic
mechanism that generates this under-investment is very dierent from that in the standard debt overhang
problem in Myers (1977), which, in contrast to our assumptions, essentially requires debt to be long term
and investment to be short term. Indeed, one of the solutions suggested to the debt overhang problem is to
use debt of shorter maturity. In our case, however, it may only worsen the outcome.
Dene the hazard rate of the distribution function g(1) as:
h(1) =
g(1)
1   G(1)
: (9)
The next proposition gives a sucient condition under which the optimally chosen cash level is increasing
in book debt.
Proposition 1. Let c be the cash reserve optimally chosen for a given level of debt, B. Then if the
hazard rate h() is non-decreasing, so that h0(1)  0, then c is a non-decreasing function of B.
The requirement that the hazard rate be nondecreasing is frequently found in game-theoretic and auction
models. It is not restrictive, as is satised for a broad range of distributions, such as normal, lognormal,
and uniform. Under this condition, Proposition 1 states that an increase in the level of debt results in an
increase in optimal cash holdings: dc

dB > 0. If cash levels increase with debt, what is the relationship between
equilibrium cash holdings and debt prices induced by this dependence? The next proposition addresses this
question.
Proposition 2. Assume that the hazard rate condition of Proposition 1 is satised. Then:
1. Creditors' expected loss L is increasing in the face value of debt B.
2. If, in addition, the elasticity of credit loss L with respect to B, B
L
dL
dB, is greater than one, then the
credit spread s is increasing in the face value of debt B.
Equation (6) shows that there are two dierent eects that changes in the face value of debt have on
the expected loss. First, there is the intuitive direct eect: ceteris paribus, larger debt levels result in a
higher probability of default and higher credit spreads ( @s
@B > 0). This is the relationship that is exploited
in most models and empirical studies. Additionally, in our model there is a second, indirect eect due to
12Draft 23/10/2007 - 01:00 Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
the endogeneity of cash holdings, since according to Proposition 1, when the level of debt increases, the rm
in equilibrium optimally saves more cash and invests less, so that dc

dB > 0. Proposition 2 states that if the
hazard rate h() is non-decreasing, then the direct eect of changes in debt on credit loss always dominates.
Hence, both the expected loss L and the retained cash c increase when debt levels increase. In practice,
this means that when debt levels are allowed to vary over time or in the cross-section, it induces a spurious
positive correlation between cash holdings and spreads. Moreover, if the elasticity of credit loss with respect
to the face value of debt is greater than 1, then the net eect is that cash and credit spreads are positively
related.13
B.2. The eect of other rm characteristics on the optimal cash policy
Proposition 2 establishes that cash balances and credit spreads may be positively related in the cross-
section of rms, since the level of debt both aects credit spreads and also drives the precautionary motive for
holding cash. In practice, the same eect may arise due to variation in rm characteristics other than debt,
if they aect both the expected default loss and also the endogenously determined level of cash holdings.
Examples of such variables include pledgeability of future cash ows (which proxies for how easily the rm
can raise nancing at the interim date), the protability of the rm's assets in place, and the volatility of
the rm's cash ows. Below, we discuss the eect of these variables on the equilibrium relationship between
cash and spreads. The formal statement of all results is delegated to Appendix B.
Pledgeability of interim-date cash ows: We relax the assumption that external nancing is com-
pletely unavailable at date 1, by assuming that at date t = 1 the rm can raise external nancing against a
fraction  of future cash ows. That is, by pledging f(I) as collateral, the rm can raise f(I) in cash from
external sources. Upon relaxing external nancing constraints in this manner, the above results concerning
the eect of variation in leverage on cash holdings and credit spreads (Propositions 1 and 2) continue to
hold.14 In Appendix B we prove that the rm's optimal cash holdings decrease in the ease of nancing, ,
provided that  is suciently large. This result obtains because if future cash ows are suciently pledge-
able, then investment itself has a precautionary function.15 The importance of this additional result stems
from the facts that the direct eect of the ease of nancing on credit spreads is negative, but the indirect
13The elasticity condition is likely to be satised when the misalignment of creditors' and equityholders' interest is high. For
example, when the investment project f(I) is very protable, equityholders are likely to invest a larger fraction of the initial
cash reserve, which results in an increase in credit spreads, because creditors do not benet from higher cash ows generated
by long-term investment.
14The results on the extended model in the presence of partial pleadgeability are available upon request.
15In general, it cannot be guaranteed that the eect on investment is monotonically increasing in  even for small values of
, since in this region cash continues to play a signicant precautionary role as well.
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eect through the cash holdings may be positive (since cash decreases in  for high values of ). If the
direct eect dominates, then changes in pledgeability induce a positive correlation between equilibrium cash
balances and credit spreads.
Protability: One way of modeling variations in rm protability is by assuming that the cash ow at
date 1 is ^ 1 = (1+p), where p is the known protability constant. It is straightforward to show that optimal
cash holdings decline in the protability parameter p, since higher future protability increases the expected
cash ow from assets in place, and thus reduces the probability of a cash shortage. Although the direct eect
of protability on spreads is also negative, the indirect eect through cash holdings is positive, since lower
cash leads to higher spreads. The appendix shows that the direct eect dominates, provided that the hazard
rate condition of Proposition 1 is satised. As a result, credit spread and cash are negatively related. In
other words, while protability may be an underlying driver of cash holdings, it is unlikely to be the source
of a positive equilibrium relationship between cash and spreads.
Volatility: What is the eect of the volatility of the interim cash ows from the assets in place, 1, on
spreads and optimal cash holdings? Intuitively, volatility introduces two mechanisms which aect the cash-
investment trade-o in the presence of risky debt. First, the precautionary motive leads the rm to increase
its cash reserves in order to reduce the probability of a cash shortage at date 1. Second, there is a risk-
shifting incentive to increasing investment at the expense of cash holdings, betting on the good outcome
in the interim period. Intuitively, the precautionary motive dominates when the probability of default is
low, while the risk-shifting motive dominates when the probability of default is high. The direct eect of an
increase in volatility is to raise spreads, while the indirect eect is to reduce spreads when the precautionary
motive dominates (and increase spreads further if the risk-shifting motive dominates). If the precautionary
motive dominates, then the relationship between spreads and cash induced by changes in volatility may be
positive. Appendix B puts a structure on the above discussion by introducing parametric assumptions on
g(1;B), and establishes that optimal cash holdings increase in volatility if the default threshold is suciently
low.
C. Exogenous variations in cash
Having shown that the correlation between spreads and cash can be spuriously positive due to the
endogeneity of cash, we now consider the scenario in which a variation in exogenous variable x induces a
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change in the optimal cash balances, but does not aect credit risk other than through its eect on cash.
This scenario produces variations in cash that we refer to as \exogenous", since they are not correlated with
factors that also directly aect the market value of debt. In other words, in equation (6), @s
@x = 0, so that
ds
dx
=
@s
@x
+
@s
@c1

dc1
dx
=
@s
@c1

dc1
dx
: (10)
If a change in factor x causes cash to increase, it then decreases the credit spread as a result, so that ds and
dc1 have opposite signs. We summarize these eects in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If @s
@x = 0, then the credit spread s is negatively related to variations in cash holdings
induced by changes in x.
This result formalizes the intuition that exogenous increases in cash holdings should be negatively related
to credit spreads. What economic factors might aect cash holdings but not the value of debt, other than
indirectly through their eect on cash? The possibilities are many. One such factor could be an unexpected
cash windfall or cash loss not due to managers' optimizing decisions. As an example, the rm may win a
lawsuit that does not change its ivestment opportunities, but results in a cash inow from the defendant.
Alternatively, a part of the rm's cash holdings can be due to managers' optimal response to factors that
do not directly aect the rm's credit risk. Below, we consider two such candidate factors, namely, growth
options and managers' private losses in nancial distress.
Growth options: We model the rm's growth options as investment opportunities that may arise at the
interim date t = 1. Cash ows from these investment opportunities will only be realized at date 2, and if
they are not pledgeable at t = 1, then their presence does not aect the value of debt that has to be repaid
at date 1. For simplicity, we assume that these investment opportunities are unrelated to the current level
of investments or other rm characteristics, and have a xed value of z > 0, which can also be interpreted
as the expected value of the growth option. We also assume that if the rm defaults on its debt, this growth
option is lost, for example, due to loss of customers or the inability to retain management or to transfer
human capital to new management.
Under these assumptions, equityholders' value can be written similar to (3) as:
E =
Z max
1;B
[ I + (c0 + 1   B) + f(I) + z]g(1)d1 ; (11)
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and the rst order condition that determines rm's investment policy takes the following form:
f0(I)   1 =
[f(I) + z]g(1;B)
1   G(1;B)
: (12)
The rst-order condition (12) implies that the presence of growth options decreases initial investment
since the desirability to survive is now higher. As we show in Appendix B, the total eect of the change in
growth options on credit spreads consists of only indirect eect though the optimal cash balance. In other
words, the equilibrium relationship between cash holdings and credit spreads induced by growth options is
negative. Note that the growth option z can also capture the deadweight costs of bankruptcy or nancial
distress incurred by the rm, which are saved in case default is averted.
Managerial losses in distress: One commonly considered variant of privately incurred distress costs
are the ones incurred by the management. Suppose that the rm's risk-neutral manager owns a share  of
the equity E, and incurs a xed, private cost  in case of nancial distress, where  > 0 and  > 0. In the
model, the only way that the manager can aect the probability of default is by adjusting the rm's cash
holdings.16 We show below that the equilibrium relationship induced by the managerial agency parameter


between cash holdings and credit spreads is negative. Intuitively, in addition to the rm-level precautionary
motive, now there is also a managerial precautionary motive to hold cash. For a given ownership level ,
the managerial motive to hold cash increases in the private costs of distress . Conversely, given , the
manager's motive to hold cash declines in her ownership of the rm . The overall eect depends on the
ratio of managerial cost to the fraction of ownership,

, which can be interpreted as a measure of agency
problems between managers and equityholders. For example, poor governance of the rm may lead to lower
exposure of management to cash ow risk of the rm, and increase their propensity to deviate from the
optimal investment (and, in turn, cash) policy. The excessive holding of cash reserves by management
reduces credit risk and spreads for the rm.
Formally, manager's objective is to choose investment I to maximize
M =   E     (1   G(1;B)) : (13)
16Thus, we assume away the manager's ability to alter the rm's debt levels and the volatility of its operations, which are
clearly relevant empirically.
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The rst order condition determining the equilibrium investment is given by
f0(I)   1 =
[f(I) +

]g(1;B)
1   G(1;B)
: (14)
As discussed in Appendix B, similarly to the case of growth options, the equilibrium relationship between
cash holdings and credit spreads induced by agency costs is negative.
D. Cash and long vs. short-term default risk
Having established the relationship between cash holdings and credit spreads and the subtlety of this
relationship arising from the precautionary motive for holding cash, we now examine the implications of cash
holdings for the probability of default. In choosing the optimal cash reserve, the rm's managers trade o
the reduction in the risk of default at date 1 against investment returns that are realized only at date 2. We
extend our model to show that cash reserves reduce the risk of default in the short turn (in period 1), but
through lower future prots may in fact increase this risk in the long run (in period 2).
Consider a modication of our earlier setting, where the rm's total debt now consists of two tranches of
dierent maturities, so that some debt with a face value of B1 is due at date 1, while that with a face value
of B2 is due at date 2. We will assume as before that no part of investment return f(I) is pledgeable at
date 1, whereas it is fully pledgeable at date 2 (Partial pledgeability at date 1 and date 2 would also suce.)
As in our previous analysis, the likelihood of default risk at date 1 is determined by the threshold point of
date-1 cash ow below which the rm cannot meet its payment at date 1, given by 1;B = B1   (c0   I),
which is decreasing in the cash reserve c1 = (c0   I).
Next, consider the risk of default at date 2. Suppose that the rm has not defaulted at date 1, so that
1 > 1;B. Then, the rm's available resources for debt payment at date 2 are the surplus cash reserve,
c2, equal to (1 + c1   B1), and the investment return f(I).17 Hence, default occurs at date 2 whenever
(1 + c1   B1) + f(I) < B2. This implies a default boundary in terms of date 1 cash ow, which we denote
as 1;B2, given by 1;B2 = 1;B + B2   f(I), below which the rm will default at date 2. Because we assume
that cash ows at date 2 are known with certainty, if the rm survives at date 1 and its outstanding debt B2
is lower than the investment return f(I), then its conditional likelihood of default at date 2 is zero. If B2 is
17For simplicity, we assume that the rm carries its surplus cash reserve to date 2. In general, if the debt due B2 is very high,
then equityholders may have a strategic motive to pay out the cash reserves as dividends in earlier periods, as otherwise all this
cash would simply accrue to creditors (Acharya, Huang, Subrahmanyam and Sundaram (2006)). We assume that covenants
restrict such strategic dividends, as is often the case in practice.
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higher than the investment return f(I), then there is a positive probability of default at date 2 as well. To
avoid default in future, the rm's remaining cash after date 1 debt repayment must be suciently high.18
The eect of the initial level of investment on the date-2 likelihood of default can be captured by
d1;B2
dI
=
d1;B
dI
  f0(I) = 1   f0(I): (15)
This equation formalizes the tradeo of precautionary cash holdings. As argued above, investment (cash
holdings) increases (decreases) the probability of default at date 1:
d1;B
dI > 0. However, since 1   f0(I) < 0
(see the equivalent rst-order condition (7)), the probability of default in the longer-term is higher as the
rm increases its cash reserve at the expense of long-term investment. Thus, we have proved the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. An increase in cash balances reduces the likelihood of default at date 1 and increases
the likelihood of default at date 2.
Proposition 4 implies that cash holdings may be negatively related to the probability of default for short
prediction horizons, but positively { for long horizons.19
E. Discussion
To summarize our theoretical results, our model predicts that the endogenous adjustment in the rm's
cash holdings in response to various factors that aect credit risk, such as leverage, protability, and the
presence of nancing constraints, can result in a positive correlation between spreads and cash. At the same
time, spreads are negatively correlated with the \exogenous" part of the variation in the rm's cash holdings,
which is due to factors that do not aect the rm's credit risk directly. We also show that cash balances
may have dierent eect on the short-term and long-term likelihoods of default.
One caveat to the above results is that they are derived by varying one of the parameters of the model
(such as leverage, protability, or growth options) while keeping all other parameters xed. In reality, these
rm characteristics are not independent. One variable that is likely to be endogenous and adjusted on a
relatively frequently basis (though not as frequently as cash) is leverage. To see how this complicates the
analysis, consider one intuitive example. Suppose that growth options introduced in Section C are at work
18Note that with complete revelation of information on interim cash ow 1 at date 1, one could argue that anticipated default
at date 2 should simply trigger default at date 1. However, a small amount of residual uncertainty, either in the investment
return f(I) or in an additional date 2 cash ow 2, would suce to avoid such an outcome.
19A similar eect may also be induced by managerial short-termism, which might be an exogenous factor driving cash holdings
above their optimal level, reducing default risk in the near future at the cost of lost protable investment opportunities.
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but managers can choose both cash and leverage at the same time. The exogenous eect of growth options
on cash is still unambiguously positive. However, an increase in growth options is also likely to decrease
optimal leverage ratio, which would induce a reduction in optimal cash holdings. Thus, two opposite eects
are at work, and without knowing how leverage and growth options are correlated in the data, it is dicult
to generalize the model's predictions.
As another example, consider the eect of protability. In the trade-o model of capital structure, an
increase in protability tends to increase optimal leverage. Therefore, the direct eect of protability on
cash, as we discussed, is clearly negative, but now an indirect mechanism is introduced which increases
optimal cash holdings. Unless we understand better the relationship between leverage and protability in
the data, the model will not provide us with more economic insights. Therefore, it should be clear that all
results above are ceteris paribus and that endogeneity can be working simultaneously at several layers.
III. The data
A. Data sources and sample selection
We study yield spreads on bonds included in the Merrill Lynch US Investment Grade Index and High
Yield Master II Index between December 1996 and December 2003. The Merrill Lynch indices include
corporate bonds with a par amount of at least 100 million dollars and remaining maturity of at least one
year. The bond price database consists of monthly bid quotes from Merrill Lynch bond trading desks. We
augment the pricing data from Merrill Lynch with descriptive bond information from the Fixed Income
Securities Database (FISD) provided by Mergent. We manually merge the data with quarterly Compustat
and CRSP, taking account of mergers, name changes, and parent/subsidiary relationships.
During the sample period, the two Merrill Lynch indices include 429,420 monthly corporate bond quotes.
We exclude observations that we cannot reliably merge with FISD and Compustat, and in most of our tests,
unless specically stated otherwise, we also exclude bonds issued by nancial companies (SIC codes 6000{
6999). We eliminate non-xed coupon bonds, asset-backed issues, bonds with embedded optionalities, such
as callable, puttable, exchangeable, convertible securities, and bonds with sinking fund provisions. Finally,
we exclude bonds with remaining time to maturity of less than one year or more than thirty years, since
risk-free data that we use to estimate spreads are not available for these maturities.
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B. Spread measurement and control variables
Our primary focus is on the correlation between credit spreads and cash holdings. We calculate bond
yield spreads as the dierence between the bond's promised yield based on its price, and the yield on a
portfolio of risk-free zero-coupon securities (STRIPS) with the same promised cash ows, as suggested by
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). This estimation method accurately controls for the shape of the term
structure. Our initial data set is an unbalanced panel of monthly observations of spreads. A potential issue
with this data structure is high representation of large rms with many outstanding bonds in any given
month. Because we are interested in the relationship between credit risk and cash reserves, which are rm{
rather than bond-specic, using all bond-month observations may potentially bias the results towards large
rms. We address this issue by averaging all spreads for a given rm in a given month, and using one
observation per rm-month in our analysis. In untabulated tests we conrm that the results are in fact
unchanged when we use all bond-month rather than rm-month observations.
We measure cash reserves using the ratio of cash and near-cash to total book assets. In regressions of
spreads, we control for rm-level credit-risk variables such as leverage, volatility, and debt maturity. Because
of their importance in structural models of credit risk, these controls are routinely used in in empirical studies
of spreads (e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)). We estimate the (quasi-) market leverage
ratio as the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of
equity at the end of the previous scal quarter. Another factor featuring prominently in credit risk models,
the volatility of assets, is not observable. We use the approach suggested by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007),
and estimate the rm asset volatility as the leverage-weighted average of the rm's one-year historic equity
volatility, and the average bond volatility for the same rating from Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007). To
control for the term premium in the corporate bond yield, we use the average remaining time to maturity
of all sample bonds outstanding at each observation date. We include the logarithm of total assets net of
cash to control for all inuences that the rm's size may exert on debt spreads. Finally, Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin (2001) nd that a signicant part of spread changes is driven by an unidentied
systematic factor. To control for all such factors, we use time dummies in most of our regressions of spreads.
Our results are insensitive to the particular denition of our right-hand side variables. They are nearly
identical if cash is measured as a fraction of assets net of cash, rather than total assets or if, following
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), we use equity volatility instead of the Schaefer-Strebulaev
proxy for asset volatility. They would be strengthened if instead of monthly dummies we used specic market
indicators such as the risk-free rate (Duee (1998)) or VIX, related to implied market volatility (Schaefer
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and Strebulaev (2007)).
C. Descriptive statistics
Table III shows the composition of our sample by rating and by industry. The sample consists of 82,676
monthly bond prices for 480 unique bond issuers. Most of our regressions include one rm observation
per month; we have 24,594 such observations. Three quarters of the sample are concentrated in the two
lowest investment rating categories, A and BBB. Junk bond spreads (those rated BB and lower) constitute
only 16.4% of the rm-month data set. This composition is similar to that documented in other corporate
bond and credit default swap data sets (e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Davydenko and
Strebulaev (2007), and also Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007) who use a very similar data set). It is worth
noting that the number of rms in each rating class does not stay the same, because ratings change over
time. Statistics reported in the rst column show ratings for the 480 rms as of the day they rst appear
in our sample. During our sample period more rms were downgraded than upgraded; in addition, the
rm is excluded from the database when it defaults. As a result, there are more junk rms in our sample
rm-month observations than is suggested by the rst column of the table. For example, six rms in the
sample were rated CCC at least once, compared to just one rm that entered the sample with that rating.
Panel B of Table III also shows the composition of the sample by industry. The highest proportion of rms
are in manufacturing, followed by utilities & transportation and consumer good production.
[TABLE III HERE]
Panel A of Table IV presents descriptive statistics on bond spreads for the whole sample, as well as for
dierent rating groups. The mean spread in the sample is 197 basis points, and the median is 135 basis
points. Spreads are higher for lower-rated bonds. Untabulated comparisons of bonds with dierent maturities
suggest that for a given rating spreads typically increase in maturity. It is interesting to note that the average
BB spread (385 basis points) is twice is high as that for BBB bonds (181 basis points). This jump in the
spread is likely to be attributable not only to the increase in the probability of default, but also to the lower
liquidity of speculative grade bonds (BB and below) compared with investment-grade bonds.
[TABLE IV HERE]
Panel B of Table IV presents descriptive statistics on rm-specic variables. Because all our rms have
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public bonds outstanding, it is not surprising that they are relatively large in size, with the median total book
assets of almost $6.5 Bn. They also have relatively high leverage ratios than broader samples not conditioned
on the presence of public bonds in the capital structure. Statistics on leverage and asset volatility are similar
to those in other studies of bond spreads. Looking at rm characteristics by rating (not reported), we nd
that rms with higher ratings are larger, less levered and volatile, more protable, have slightly larger capital
expenditures, and return substantially more cash to shareholders via dividends and repurchases than riskier
rms.
Expressed as a proportion of total assets, cash holdings of our rms are lower than those in broader
Compustat samples that are typically used in empirical studies. For instance, in Opler et al. (1999) the
average ratio of cash to net assets (total assets minus cash) is 17% and the median is 6.5%, compared to 4.4%
and 2.0% in our sample. These substantial dierences are due in part to the fact that our sample does not
include rms with zero or near-zero leverage, which tend to hold signicant amounts of cash (Strebulaev and
Yang (2006)), and in part to the fact that bond issuers are likely to be less nancially constrained and value
cash holdings less. The dierences are all the more signicant given the fact that our sample corresponds
to recent years, during which corporate cash holdings increased substantially. Indeed, Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz (2006) document that the overall corporate cash holdings now exceed total corporate debt, so that the
aggregate leverage is negative. Figure 1 illustrates that cash holdings are U-shaped in credit rating, with
safest and riskiest rms holding more cash than average.
IV. Empirical results
Our model demonstrates that when cash holdings are chosen endogenously by the levered rm, optimal cash
may depend on various credit risk factors that also aect spreads. As a result, OLS regressions that treat
cash as an exogenous parameter may yield misleading results. We now show that the positive correlation
between cash and spreads documented in Tables I and II is spurious rather than causal, and is reversed when
we use instrumental variables suggested by the model to identify exogenous variations in cash. We then look
at the role of liquid asset holdings in empirical default-predicting models, and present evidence that changes
in credit risk cause rms to adjust their cash holdings in response.
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A. Exploring the cash-spread correlation
A.1. Is cash a proxy for credit risk?
Our theory shows how the positive correlation between cash and spreads documented previously can
arise as a by-product of the precautionary motive for holding cash reserves by levered rms, which results
in riskier rms having both more cash and higher credit spreads. Why is cash still positive and signicant
after controlling for standard credit risk factors used in empirical studies of spreads, such as leverage and
volatility? One potential explanation is that standard leverage and volatility measures do not fully account for
the underlying credit risk in the presence of cash endogeneity. Empirical studies that use these explanatory
variables generally explain only 30 to 40% of the variation in levels and changes in credit spreads (e.g.,
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)). Hence, in regressions of Tables I and II cash may be a
proxy for the residual credit risk not fully accounted for by these factors. To investigate this possibility, in
this subsection we look at how the correlation between cash and spreads is aected by alternative controls
for dierences in credit risk.
The results are presented in columns (1) to (5) of Table V. Univariate regression (1) is identical to that
in column (1) of Table I, and included in the table for the ease of comparison. Column (2) introduces stan-
dard controls for (quasi-market) leverage used in much of the literature, and the proxy for asset volatility
suggested by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007). The correlation between cash and spreads falls slightly once
these variables are introduced, but remains highly statistically signicant. To control for credit risk more
accurately, in regression (3) we add a full set of dummy variables for the rm's credit rating from Moody's,
which conveniently summarizes the rating agency's opinion about the rm's creditworthiness. Ratings pro-
vide an admittedly crude summary of credit risk, as evidenced in regression (3) by the fact that leverage
and volatility remain strongly signicant determinants of spreads.20 Nevertheless, column (3) shows the
introduction of rating dummies not only increases the regression's explanatory power, but also dramatically
aects the correlation between spreads and cash holdings, which becomes small and insignicant.
The disappearance of the signicance of the cash coecient is consistent with the conjecture that the
positive correlation documented previously arises because cash holdings and credit spreads are both driven
by factors subsumed by the credit rating. However, ratings in these regressions are treated as a black-box
proxy for credit risk, and the role of cash in the rating agencies' decision process is unclear. An alternative
way to improve regression specication is by constructing better proxies for credit risk. To this end, we
20This is consistent with the fact that ratings are rarely adjusted immediately in response to changing credit conditions due
to rating agencies' desire to achieve a balance between \ratings stability" and accuracy (Cantor and Mann (2007)).
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estimate market leverage ratios and the volatility of assets implied by the time series of equity values, which
incorporate expectations about default and cash policy. Specically, we calibrate Merton's (1974) structural
model of credit risk using the KMV approach outlined in Crosbie and Bohn (2001) and rst implemented in
the academic literature by Vassalou and Xing (2004). Essentially, the procedure uses a year-long series of
market equity values in conjunction with data on outstanding debt to yield estimates of the (unobserved)
market value of the rm's assets, as well as the volatility of assets and the market leverage ratio.21 Once
market-implied leverage and volatility estimates are obtained, we use them in regressions of spreads in
the expectation that they should provide better controls for the fundamental credit risk factors that aect
spreads.
Regressions that use these controls are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table V. Compared to column
(2) that uses standard leverage and volatility proxies, the regression in column (4) has higher explanatory
power, with an R2 of 0.48 compared to 0.43. Consequently, with credit risk better accounted for by the
market-implied variables, cash in this regression is not signicantly related to spreads. The coecient on
cash, already less than a third of that in column (2), is further reduced when we control for rm size, maturity,
and systematic eects in regression (5), which is identical to that in column (4) of Table I but for the use
of market-implied leverage and volatility proxies. Once again, as a result of using these variables, R2 is
increased and cash is rendered insignicant. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the conjecture
that the positive and signicant coecient documented previously is spurious rather than causal, arising
from the endogenous dependence of cash on the rm's credit risk.
[TABLE V HERE]
A.2. Exogenous variations in cash
The evidence so far suggests that the positive correlation between cash and spreads arises because en-
dogenously determined cash holdings depend on credit risk factors, and disappears once those factors are
accurately controlled for using ratings or market-based proxies. Our model further suggests that, consistent
with the simple intuition, exogenous variations in cash holdings not induced by adjustments to changes in
credit risk should be negatively related to spreads. The model suggests that future investment opportunities
and measures of managerial self-interest can provide instruments for identifying such exogenous variations in
21The details of the estimation procedure can be found in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007).
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cash. To proxy for growth options, we use the median ratio of R&D expenditures to sales in the rm's 3-digit
SIC industry in each calendar year.22 In addition to investment opportunities, the ratio of the manager's
private costs of distress to the fraction of the rm's equity that she owns is another instrument in the model
that induces variations in cash unrelated to credit risk. We assume that the CEO's salary and bonus are
at risk if the rm defaults. Accordingly, our agency term is constructed as the ratio of the CEO's salary,
bonus and other monetary compensation to the market value of her shares and options, estimated using the
ExecuComp database.23
We employ these two instruments in IV regressions of spreads using specications that mirror those in
columns (1) to (5) of Table V. The results of these tests are shown in column (6) to (10) of the same table.
The eect of control variables in IV and OLS regressions is similar, but the eect of cash holdings is not:
The cash coecient is negative throughout, and statistically signicant, except for regression (7). Consistent
with our predictions, IV regressions show that exogenous variations in cash are negatively correlated with
spreads. However, although the simple intuition is conrmed in these regressions, our previous results show
that in simple specications it is overturned by the eect of endogeneity, which is of rst order importance
in the interaction between cash and credit risk.
A.3. Robustness and extensions
Table VI shows that the positive correlation between cash and spreads in base-case OLS regressions and
the sign reversal in instrumental variable regressions in the presence of model-implied credit risk controls
are robust to the inclusion of various factors that may potentially aect the rm's level of cash. Regressions
(1) and (5) address the concern that dierent rms may have dierent liquidity needs due to the nature of
their business, and these may be correlated with their credit risk. We control for this possibility by including
the current ratio (current assets over current liabilities) in our regressions, and nd that current liabilities
do not explain our ndings; similar results obtain when we use the cash ratio (cash over current liabilities)
instead. Dierences in cash holdings across rms may be related to covenants that restrict minimum liquidity
levels. To test this hypothesis, we collect data on bank covenants from the LPC DealScan database, and
construct dummy variables summarizing the presence of such covenants. Regressions (2) and (6) show that
controls for the presence of these covenants do not alter our conclusion regarding the relationship between
22We prefer R&D to the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities, because in addition to other well-known
problems with market-to-book in our setting it is also mechanically correlated with the market leverage ratio, which renders it
unsuitable as a potential instrument.
23ExecuComp reports the Black-Scholes value of new option grants, but not the current value of previously granted options.
We use the algorithm suggested by Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) to estimate the total market value of the CEO's options.
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cash and spreads. Controls for covenants that restrict capital expenditures and thus can also aect cash (not
shown) yield similar conclusions. Finally, to demonstrate that our results are not due to patterns of cash
holdings and credit risk for dierent industries, in regressions (3) and (7) we control for industry eects by
including dummy variables for the 49 Fama-French industries. These controls also have little eect on the
cash coecient in either OLS or IV regressions. Overall, the positive correlation between the two documented
in Tables I and II is a robust phenomenon in the data.
[TABLE VI HERE]
One potential alternative explanation for the positive correlation between liquidity and credit spreads, sug-
gested by Myers and Rajan (1998), is based on the moral hazard problem. Their theory suggests that
cash-rich rms cannot commit not to squander existing cash, and may therefore face higher cost of debt
compared to rms with xed assets that cannot be as easily dissipated. The original Myers and Rajan
(1998) describes the behavior of nancial rms, for which liquid assets can be destroyed most easily. There-
fore, it is natural to explore whether moral hazard is behind the eects we document by comparing the
cash-spread coecient for nonnancial rms that we looked at previously with that for nancial rms.
The base-case regression for nancial rms is reported in column (4) of Table VI. In contrast to non-
nancials, spreads of nancial rms are negatively and signicantly correlated with cash holdings, conforming
to the simple intuition that higher solvency reduces the cost of debt due to the lower risk of default. The
negative correlation is also found in univariate regressions (not shown), and is consistent with the fact that
nancial rms on average have higher credit quality (with higher concentration on the left of the ratings
spectrum in Figure 1), and for them credit risk is less important in determining their cash policy. In light of
this evidence, explanation of our original results based on the precautionary motive for saving cash appears
to be more plausible than that based on moral hazard.
B. Balance sheet liquidity and the probability of default
Although our evidence shows that the eect of endogeneity on the relationship between cash and credit
risk is of rst order importance, empirical studies so far have not accounted for this possibility. Because
default is often thought of as being caused by cash shortages, most empirical default-predicting models include
various proxies for balance sheet liquidity, treating them as independent variables expected to reduce the
probability of default. Among the best known models, Altman's (1968) z-score includes WC/TA, the ratio
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of working capital (the dierence between current assets and current liabilities) to total assets, Zmijevski's
model (1984) and Altman et al.'s (1977) ZETA-score model use the current ratio CA/CL (current assets
over current liabilities), and Ohlson's (1980) O-score uses both WC/TA and CL/CA to proxy for liquidity.
However, despite the intuitive appeal and widespread use of these liquidity proxies, Begley et al. (1996),
Shumway (2001), and Hillegeist et al. (2004), as well as Ohlson (1980) and Zmijevski (1984), do not nd
that they are negatively and signicantly associated with default. This has been a puzzling nding in this
literature.
Our model predicts that the correlation between liquidity and the probability of default depends on the
trade-o between a rm's desire to conserve cash in order to survive a liquidity shortfall in the short run, and
a reduction in investment that reduces expected cash ows over the longer horizon. If the rm is constrained
in accessing outside nancing and faces a non-trivial possibility of a liquidity shortfall in the near future, it
may decide to conserve more cash at the expense of longer-term cash ows. Higher balance sheet liquidity
should then result in a lower short-term probability of a liquidity crunch, but may also lead to lower future
cash ows, and thus a higher probability of default over longer horizons.
To test the hypothesis that the correlation between liquidity and default depends on the prediction
horizon, we estimate hazard models of default for our sample rms over three horizons: one quarter, one
year, and three years. We use the Default Research Service database from Moody's to identify all public
bond defaults in our sample, including missed payments, distressed bond exchanges, and bankruptcy lings.24
We estimate multiperiod logit regressions, equivalent to a discrete hazard model (Shumway (2001)), using
specications suggested by Altman (1968) and Zmijevski (1984), and also separating cash from their liquidity
measures.
The results of these tests are reported in Table VII. Regressions in columns (1) and (2) are estimated
for the short-term prediction horizon. The dependent variable in these regressions is one if the rm defaults
within the next scal quarter, and zero otherwise. As expected, proxies for balance sheet liquidity are
negatively correlated with the short-term probability of default both in the z-score specication and in
the Zmijevski model, although only for working capital (with and without cash) is the eect statistically
signicant. This result is consistent with Davydenko (2007), who nds that rms with restricted access
to external nancing are more likely to default over the next quarter when their liquid assets fall short of
current liabilities.
In contrast to short-term predictions, columns (3) to (6) show that these same measures of liquidity may
24With the exception of Altman et al. (1977), all the papers cited above are restricted to predicting formal bankruptcy lings.
Since failure does not necessarily involve bankruptcy, we use a wider denition of default adopted by rating agencies.
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be positively related to the probability of default in one and three years, and more so for the three year
horizon than for the one year horizon. This nding echoes the evidence in extant bankruptcy-predicting
studies cited above, which usually use one year as the prediction horizon and nd liquidity measures to be
uncorrelated or positively correlated with bankruptcy.
[TABLE VII HERE]
Overall, the results of these tests are consistent with the positive correlation between cash and spreads
documented earlier, as well as with our explanation of that correlation based on the endogeneity of cash.
They suggest that the eect of balance sheet liquidity on the probability of default for longer horizons cannot
be adequately captured by the standard approach that treats liquid assets as an independent variable, and
emphasize once again the importance of the endogenous cash policy in the presence of credit risk.
C. Regressions of changes in cash
The evidence shown so far is consistent with the hypothesis that in cross section, riskier rms hold higher
cash reserves. By the same logic, a change in credit risk for any given rm should trigger an adjustment in
its cash policy. For example, we would expect rms that have recently been downgraded by credit rating
agencies to increase the amount of cash they retain out of their cash ows in order to reduce the probability
of a cash shortage in the face of the change in credit risk that has triggered the downgrade. However, such
adjustments in cash holdings may not be feasible if the rm is not generating high enough cash ow, which
is more likely in the case of unprotable lower-rated rms, which also need cash the most. This reasoning
suggests that there may be a concave relationship between changes in ratings and changes in cash reserves.
To test this hypothesis, we regress annual changes in cash holdings on the change in the credit rating in
\notches," where the rating of AAA is coded as 1, AA+ as 2, AA as 3, etc.25 We also use a set of control
variables suggested by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004). The most important of these is the annual
cash ow, which provides the rm with a means of increasing its cash reserve should it choose to do so.
Table VIII reports the results of estimating these regressions for the whole sample, and separately for
dierent beginning-of-the-year credit ratings. The positive correlation between changes in cash and ratings
means that decreases in the credit quality are associated with increases in cash reserves, as positive values of
25An industry convention is that a change, say, from BBB- to BB+ is one notch. A change from AA+ to BBB+, for example,
is then three notches down.
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the rating change variable correspond to downgrades and increases in credit risk. Columns (3) to (7) suggest
that the relationship between changes in cash and credit risk is indeed concave. For safest investment-
grade ratings there is virtually no relationship between the rm's rating and its cash policy, presumably
because these rms still have ample access to short-term nancing (indeed, most of these rms should have
uninterrupted commercial paper programs). The eect is very dierent for rms rated BBB, for most of
which a downgrade means falling either very close to or into the junk category, with access to nancing
becoming substantially more dicult. For example, these rms often have to cancel all their commercial
paper programs. One reaction to the downgrade we see is an increase in cash holdings. We nd similar
results BB-rated rms as well. In contrast to these medium-low ratings, for rms at the extreme end of junk
in column (7) rating downgrades do not result in signicant increases in cash holdings, as cash ows of these
struggling rms are not sucient for that purpose.
To sum up, the evidence on changes in cash holdings in response to a rating downgrade is consistent with
and further corroborates our earlier evidence on the link between endogenously chosen cash holdings and
the credit quality of the rm.
[TABLE VIII HERE]
V. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we document a positive correlation between cash holdings and credit spreads, and argue that
it can be explained by endogenous adjustments in cash holdings by rms that worry about the possibility
of a liquidity shortage, which in the presence of restrictions on external nancing can trigger costly default.
Our model predicts such a spurious positive correlation when future cash ows are only partially pldedgeable
and when the benets of investment can only be realized if the rm does not default on its debt. At the same
time, exogenous variations in the rm's cash holdings that are unrelated to credit risk factors are predicted
to be negatively related to spreads. The simple intuition that predicts that rms with high cash holdings
should be safer only accounts for the direct eect of cash on spreads, and misses the indirect eect due to
the endogeneity of cash, which our evidence suggests dominates in practice.
There are at least two important implications of our results for credit-risk studies. First, structural models
starting with Merton (1974) focus primarily on leverage and volatility as determinants of credit spreads, and
ignore the potential eect of cash. Some models assume that default is triggered by cash ow shortages, but
nevertheless do not allow for an endogenous determination of the rm's cash holdings (Kim, Ramaswamy
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and Sundaresan (1993), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996)). Our model suggests that rm characteristics that
determine credit spreads, such as leverage, volatility, protability, and nancing constraints, may also aect
the rm's cash holdings, which in turn aect spreads. Embedding cash and its determinants in structural
models of credit risk may be an important challenging question for future research. At the least, our results
suggest that common empirical specications in studies of credit spreads, which use credit risk variables
suggested by extant structural debt-pricing models, may omit important variables that determine rm's
cash holdings and spreads.
Second, our results suggest a more subtle approach to accounting for the role of balance sheet liquidity
in empirical credit risk studies. For example, Altman (1968)'s z-score and other similar empirical models of
default typically control for the rm's balance sheet liquidity, treating liquidity as an independent variable.
We show that the correlation between endogenous liquidity and the probability of default may depend on the
prediction horizon. While for short-term horizons cash holdings of rms with restricted access to external
nancing can be considered xed, for longer horizons typical in such studies the endogeneity of cash and
other liquid assets becomes a dominating factor that may result in perverse conclusions regarding their role
in distress.
Our ndings call for more attention to the eect of balance sheet liquidity on credit risk than extant
studies typically devote to this question, and emphasize the crucial role of endogeneity of cash. Incorporating
endogenous cash holdings into structural models of credit risk in a manner similar to recent models by
Acharya et al. (2006), Anderson and Carverhill (2007), and Asvanunt, Broadie, and Sundaresan (2007) may
be a promising avenue for improving their ability to explain empirically observed spreads.
Appendix A: Proofs of propositions in the paper
Proof of Proposition 1: Dene function m(I;B) as follows:
m(I;B) = (f
0(I)   1)  
f(I)g(1;B)
1   G(1;B)
:
With the hazard rate h(x) dened as in the statement of proposition, we can rewrite this as
m(I;B) = (f
0(I)   1)   f(I)h(1;B):
From (8) it follows that m(I
;B) = 0. Therefore,
dI

dB
=  
@m
@B
@m
@I
:
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Since I
 is the optimal solution of the maximization problem,
@m
@I < 0. Thus, for
dI
dB to be negative, it must be
that
@m
@B
=  f(I)h
0(1;B) < 0;
where we have employed the fact that
@1;B
@B = 1. Note that formally,
h
0(1;B) =
(1   G(1;B))g
0(1;B) + g(1;B)
2
(1   G(1;B))2 :
Requiring
dI
dB to be negative is thus equivalent to requiring that h
0(1;B) > 0. }
Proof of Proposition 2:
1. Recall that expected loss L is dened by (4) as
L = B   D =
Z 1;B
min
[B   (c1 + 1)]g(1)d1:
Taking the derivative of L with respect to B, we get
@L
@B
=
Z 1;B
min

1  
@c

1
@B

g(1)d(1) + (B   c

1   1;B)g(1;B):
By noting that 1;B = (B   c1) we can now write the derivative of L with respect to B as
@L
@B
=

1  
@c

1
@B

G(1;B):
It is sucient to show that
@c
1
@B < 1. From Proposition 1 we can write
@c
1
@B =  
@I
@B as
@c

1
@B
=
@m
@B
@m
@I
=
 f(I)h
0(1;B)
f(I)h0(1;B) + f0(I)h(1;B)   f00(I);
since the derivative of 1;B with respect to I as well as B equal one. Given that h
0() > 0, f
0() > 0, and
f
00() < 0, the proposition follows.
2. Recall that
s =
L
B   L
:
By taking the derivative of s with respect to B we get
@s
@B
=
B
@L
@B   L
(B   L)2 :
The above expression is positive when and only when the elasticity of L to B,
B
L
@L
@B, is larger than 1.}
Appendix B: Statements and proofs of discussed extensions
Eect of partial pledgeability: In this extension, we allow some of the date 2 cash ows to be pledgeable
at date 1, thereby relaxing the nancial constraint of the rm in states when there is a cash shortfall to pay o
debtholders.
We assume that future cash ows f(I) are partially pledgeable to external nance markets at date 1. In particular,
if a fraction  of these cash ows are pledged to investors, then the rm can raise nancing only up to f(I), where
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 2 [0;1). The parameter  can thus be interpreted as capturing the ease of raising external nance against unrealized
future cash ows, or the dilution cost of external nance, or more broadly a metaphor for the mismatch between the
maturity of debt (some upcoming short-term payments) and investments (possibly of longer term in nature).
With partial pledgeability of future cash ows, the rm has more than its slack S in order to pay down its debt
at date 1. In particular, the default boundary is now given as ^ 1;B = B   (c0   I)   f(I) = 1;B   f(I). In turn,
equityholders' value can be expressed as:
^ E =
Z max
1;B
[f(I) + (c0   I + 1   B)]g(1)d1
+
Z 1;B
^ 1;B
[f(I)  
1

(B   (c0   I)   1)]g(1)d1 : (16)
In this expression, the rst term is the same as equityholders' value E with  = 0 (equation 3). The additional
source of value arises from the fact that over the range 1 2 [^ 1;B;1;B], equityholders lose a fraction of the future
investment returns. In particular, in order to cover the shortfall in debt payment of (B  (c0  I) 1), equityholders
\liquidate" their investment partly suering a net outow of
1
 [B   (c0   I)   1].
Equityholders nd optimal investment ^ I
 by maximizing their value:
@ ^ E
@I
=

f
0(I)  
1

 
1   G(^ 1;B)

+

1

  1

(1   G(1;B)) = 0: (17)
In particular, this rst order condition implies that f
0(I
) 2 [1;
1
 ]. That is, we still obtain underinvestment relative
to the rst-best investment which satises f
0(I) = 1. Only in the extreme case when  = 1 is the eciency restored,
and investment is at its rst best level.
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The expected loss function for creditors is now given by
^ L =
Z ^ 1;B
min
[B   (c0 + 1 + f(I)   I)]g(1)d1 : (18)
It can be shown that Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the benchmark model all hold for this general case with any
pledgeability fraction  < 1. These proofs are available from authors upon request. Furthermore, we obtain the
following relationship between cash holdings and pledgeability of future cash ows.
Proposition 5. The optimal cash holdings ^ c

1 decline in pledgeability  for  suciently large.
Proof of Proposition 5: Applying the implicit function theorem to the rst order condition ^ m(I;) = 0 (equation
17) determining ^ I
, we obtain that
d^ I

d
=  
@ ^ m
@
@ ^ m
@ ^ I
:
Since ^ I
 is the optimal solution of the maximization problem,
@ ^ m
@ ^ I < 0. Thus, for
d^ I
d to be positive, it must be
that
@ ^ m
@
=
1
2
h
1   G(^ 1;B)

  (1   G(1;B)) +
 
f
0(I)   1

g(^ 1;B)f(I)
i
> 0; (19)
where I equals ^ I
.
Note that the rst two terms on the right hand side together constitute a positive eect since 1;B > ^ 1;B. That
is, as  increases, they lead investment to increase, because of the fact that when future cash ows are pledgeable,
investment itself acquires a precautionary dimension and helps to reduce the likelihood of default. The third term
constitutes a negative eect since f
0(I) 
1
 , and as  increases, this term causes investment to fall. This eect is
similar to the eect in the benchmark model in that since future investments are not fully pledgeable, cash also has
some precautionary role to play.
26In particular, in this case, there is no relationship between cash and credit spreads, as the level of debt B varies. This
illustrates that a crucial requirement for spreads to be positively related to cash (as we nd in the data) is that rms face at
least some nancing constraints in the form of lack of full pledgeability of unrealized future cash ows.
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While in general, it is dicult to sign
@ ^ m
@ , the limiting case when  tends to one can be signed.
Note that as  goes to one, we obtain that f
0(I) = 1, so that
@ ^ m
@ converges to [G(1;B) G(^ 1;B)], which is positive
since ^ 1;B = [1;B   f(I)] when  = 1. In turn,
d^ I
d > 0 and
d^ c
1
d < 0. Intuitively, with suciently high pledgeability,
only investment plays a precautionary role and cash holdings decline as pledgeability rises even further.
27 }
Eect of protability: We introduce variation in rm protability by assuming that cash ow at date 1 is
^ 1 = (1 + p), where p is the known protability constant. As can easily be shown, cash holdings of the rm decline
in the protability parameter p. Although the direct eect of protability on spreads is also negative (as the rm
becomes more protable, it is easier to cover debt payments), the indirect eect through cash holdings is positive
since lower cash leads to higher spreads. The next proposition shows that in the case of protability, the direct eect
dominates:
Proposition 6. Assume the hazard rate condition of Proposition 1 is satised.
Then, optimal cash holdings c

1 decrease in protability p.
Nevertheless, creditors' expected loss L and credit spread s are decreasing in the protability parameter p.
Sketch of proof of Proposition 6: We denote the benchmark distribution analyzed so far as g() over [min;max]
and the more protable distribution as g(;p) over [min + p;max + p] such that g(;p) = g(   p) for p > 0 and p
small enough such that the default point 1;B remains above (min + p). Then, it is straightforward to show that by
substituting ^  =    p, one obtains an almost identical rst-order condition as in equation (8) with the important
dierence that the default point 1;B is replaced by (1;B   p).
The rest of the proof follows along the lines of that of Propositions 1 and 2. In particular, we obtain that (i)
dI
dp > 0 under the hazard rate condition of Proposition 1; (ii) In turn,
dc
1
dp < 0, but it can be shown that
dc
1
dp >  1;
(iii)
@L
@p =
@L
@c1 < 0; (iv) From (ii) and (iii),
dL
dp =
@L
@p +
@L
@c1 
dc1
dp < 0; (v) And, nally, since the spread s is monotone
in the loss L, we also obtain that
ds
dp < 0. }
Eect of volatility: Suppose that 1  N(1;
2).
28 The next proposition states the condition under which an
increase in volatility leads to an increase in the precautionary cash savings.
Proposition 7. Optimal cash holdings c

1 increase in volatility  if the default point 1;B is below the mean
interim cash-ow level 1.
Proof of Proposition 7 : As in the proof of Proposition 1, the sign of
dI
d is the same as the sign of
@m
@ . With the
normality assumption, we have
g(1;B;) =
1
p
2
e
 
(1;B 1)2
22 ; and G(1;B;) =
Z 1;B
 1
g(1;)d1:
Then, we obtain that
@g(1;B;)
@
= g(1;B;)
(1;B   1)
2
3 ; and
@G(1;B;)
@
=
Z 1;B
 1
(1   1)
2
3 g(1;)d1:
27 However, as  goes to zero, in general it is not possible to sign @ ^ m
@ . On the one hand, investment no longer plays
a precautionary role since ^ 1;B = 1;B. On the other hand, the last term in the expression for @ ^ m
@ which captures the
precautionary role of cash, also goes to zero. Hence, in this case, both the numerator and the denominator in @ ^ m
@ converge to
zero, so that the limit must be calculated using the L'Hospital rule to be the limit as  goes to zero of
1
2
h
f(I)g(^ 1;B) + (2f0(I)   1)g(^ 1;B)f(I)  
 
f0(I)   1

g0(^ 1;B)f(I)2
i
: (20)
This, in turn, converges to
f0(I)g(1;B)f(I)  
1
2
g0(1;B)f(I)2;
which cannot be signed in general.
28 While this introduces the possibility of a negative cash ow to creditors, we assume that the parameters are such that this
likelihood is tiny.
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Then, some algebra (details available upon request) leads to the following expression for
@m
@ :
@m
@
=
 f(I)g(1;B;)
[1   G(1;B;)]23[(1;B   1)
2(1   G(1;B;)) +
Z 1;B
 1
(1   1)
2g(1)d1]:
What matters for the sign of
@m
@ is thus the term inside [] on the right hand side. By writing (1   1)
2 as
(1   1;B + 1;B   1)
2, and expanding, we obtain that this term can be expressed as
(1;B   1)
2 +
Z 1;B
 1
[(1   1;B)
2 + 2(1   1;B)(1;B   1)]g(1)d1:
Now, note that
R 1;B
 1 (1  1;B)g(1)d1 is always negative. Therefore, if 1;B < 1, then the entire term inside []
in the expression for
@m
@ is positive, and, in turn,
@m
@ is negative. This implies that under the condition that default
risk of the rm is not too high, investment I
 declines with volatility and cash holdings c

1 increase in volatility. 
Eect of growth options: Consider the benchmark model with growth option z, as described in Section C.
We obtain the following result showing the eect of growth options on credit spreads:
Proposition 8. The equilibrium level of cash holdings, c

1 is positively related to the growth option z. Credit
spread s is negatively related to the growth option z only through the change in optimal cash balance.
Proof of Proposition 8: At the optimal level of investment m(I
;z) = 0, where m(I;z) is as dened in the proof
of Proposition 1 but with f(I) replaced by [f(I) + z]. Then it follows that
dI

dz
=  
@m
@z
@m
@I
But
@m
@I < 0 because I
 is the optimal investment level, and so the sign depends on the sign of
@m
@z . Taking the
derivative of m(I
;z) with respect to z, we obtain that this cross-partial derivative equals [ zh(1;B)], which is
negative. It follows thus that
dc
1
dz =  
dI
dz > 0.
Next, note that
ds
dz =
B
(B L)2
dL
dz , and from the expression for expected loss in equation (4), we obtain that
dL
dz =  
dc1
dz Pr[1 < 1;B] < 0. }
Eect of agency costs: Again, consider the benchmark model with private managerial costs upon distress 
and managerial ownership share of theta, as described in Section C. Then, the following result which is analogous to
that for growth options is obtained:
Proposition 9. The equilibrium level of cash holdings, c

1 is positively related to the agency parameter

. Credit
spread s is negatively related to the agency parameter

 only through the change in optimal cash balance.
Proof of Proposition 9: The proof is identical to the one above since it involves only replacing growth options z
by the agency parameter

. }
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Table I. Regressions of bond spreads
This table reports the results of regressions of credit spreads on cash holdings and other
variables. The dependent variable is the annualized bond spread in percentage points rel-
ative to a cash ow-matched portfolio of STRIPS, averaged over all outstanding straight
bonds for each rm-month observation in the sample. Cash/Assets is cash and near-cash
divided by total book assets. Leverage is calculated as the book value of total debt divided
by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Asset volatility is
the leverage-weighted average of the rm's one-year historic equity volatility and average
bond volatility for the same rating. Log(Assets) is the logarithm of the total book assets
of the issuing rm in millions of dollars. Maturity is the remaining bond maturity in years
on the observation date, averaged over all bonds with available spreads for each rm-month
observation in the sample. The sample consists of monthly observations for nonnancial
U.S. rms between December 1996 and December 2003. Accounting variables and equity
prices are measured at the end of the previous scal quarter. Regressions (1) and (4) are es-
timated using OLS with standard errors adjusted for rm clustering using the Huber/White
estimator. Cross-sectional regressions (2) and (5) use the means of all variables for each
rm. Fama-MacBeth regressions (3) and (6) are time-series averages of the coecients from
monthly cross-sectional regressions estimated over the whole period (85 months), with stan-
dard errors adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure. Absolute values
of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
OLS CS FMB OLS CS FMB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash/Assets 3.14** 6.27*** 1.96*** 3.34*** 3.05*** 3.70***
(2.57) (3.76) (3.58) (3.88) (2.73) (8.57)
Leverage 5.81*** 5.17*** 5.94***
(14.41) (18.27) (10.44)
Asset volatility 6.18*** 7.59*** 6.33***
(9.12) (10.33) (12.03)
Log(Assets) -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.309***
(5.99) (5.11) (9.94)
Maturity 0.01 0.01 0.002
(1.10) (0.66) (0.12)
Const. 1.82*** 1.78*** 2.01*** 0.33 13.45* 1.05***
(26.29) (16.59) (12.14) (0.70) (1.73) (3.59)
Monthly dummies No No Yes Yes
N 24,258 24,258 24,258 21,527 21,527 21,527
Adj. R2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.49 0.78 0.43
No. of months 85 85
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Table II. Regressions of spreads by rating
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of credit spreads by rating group.
The dependent variable is the annualized bond spread in percentage points relative to
a cash ow-matched portfolio of STRIPS, averaged over all outstanding straight bonds
for each rm-month observation in the sample. Cash/Assets is cash and near-cash
divided by total book assets. Firm-month observations for dierent rms are grouped
by rms' senior unsecured rating as of the observation date. Leverage is calculated
as the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the
market value of equity. Asset volatility is the leverage-weighted average of the rm's
one-year historic equity volatility and average bond volatility for the same rating.
Log(Assets) is the logarithm of the total book assets of the issuing rm in millions of
dollars. Maturity is the remaining bond maturity in years on the observation date,
averaged over all bonds with available spreads for each rm-month observation in
the sample. The sample consists of monthly observations for nonnancial U.S. rms
between December 1996 and December 2003. Accounting variables and equity prices
are measured at the end of the previous scal quarter. Standard errors are adjusted
for rm clustering using the Huber/White estimator. Absolute values of t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
AAA-AA A BBB BB B-CCC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash/Assets 0.16 1.20* 3.20*** 4.52** 8.34**
(0.44) (1.86) (2.95) (2.13) (2.08)
Leverage 0.93*** 1.27*** 2.28*** 6.27*** 14.19***
(3.61) (4.89) (7.40) (6.94) (5.51)
Asset volatility 0.24 1.11*** 1.78*** 3.29** 4.08
(0.78) (3.90) (3.37) (2.02) (1.34)
Log(Assets) -0.03** -0.12*** -0.21*** -0.07 -0.86**
(2.05) (5.36) (4.88) (0.57) (2.30)
Maturity 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02 0.11*
(5.58) (5.86) (2.80) (0.81) (1.98)
Const. 0.50*** 1.09*** 1.36*** -1.30 -0.66
(3.34) (6.10) (3.26) (1.17) (0.19)
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,860 7,105 9,138 2,567 839
Adj. R2 0.75 0.58 0.41 0.45 0.55
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Table III. Sample size and industry composition
This table shows the number of unique rms, as well as spreads (bond-months), rm-months,
and rm quarters in the sample, by rating and by broad industry group. For rms whose rating
changes during the sample period, the rst column of Panel A report the senior unsecured
rating as of the rst date the rm appears in the data set. The bond sample consists of straight
xed-coupon bonds without embedded optionalities, with remaining maturity between one and
thirty years, issued by non-nancial U.S. rms. Spreads on these bonds are observed at monthly
intervals between December 1996 and December 2003.
Firms Spreads Firm-months Firm-quarters
Panel A: Observations by rating
AAA 8 1,224 449 155
AA 36 6,090 1,672 575
A 159 30,627 8,029 2,762
BBB 191 33,281 10,448 3,606
BB 60 8,364 2,859 1,013
B 25 2,444 989 357
CCC 1 646 148 57
Panel B: Observations by industry
Consumer goods 70 14,167 3,748 1,304
Manufacturing 93 12,505 4,528 1,570
High Tech & Telecoms 53 8,884 2,378 829
Wholesale and retail trade 61 12,478 3,537 1,221
Oil & Chemicals 58 9,324 3,220 1,108
Utilities & Transportation 81 14,439 4,012 1,392
Other industries 64 10,879 3,171 1,101
Total 480 82,676 24,594 8,525
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Table IV. Descriptive statistics
This table reports summary statistics on credit spreads and other variables by rm-
month observation. Panel A reports the annualized bond spread in percentage points,
averaged over all outstanding straight bonds for each rm-month observation in the
sample, by the rm's senior unsecured rating as of the observation date. The bench-
mark risk-free yield is the yield on a cash ow-matched portfolio of STRIPS. STRIPS
yields are observed as of the observation date, and are linearly approximated for dates
between the maturity dates of two STRIPS. Panel B reports rm characteristics for
the sample of rm-months, as of the end of the previous scal quarter. Total assets)
is the total book assets of the issuing rm in billions of dollars. Cash/Assets is cash
and near-cash divided by total book assets. Cash/Net assets is cash and near-cash
divided by total book assets minus cash. Leverage is calculated as the book value
of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of
equity. Asset volatility is the leverage-weighted average of the rm's one-year historic
equity volatility and average bond volatility for the same rating. Maturity is the
remaining bond maturity in years on the observation date, averaged over all bonds
with available spreads for each rm-month observation in the sample. The sample
consists of monthly observations for nonnancial U.S. rms between December 1996
and December 2003.
Mean Median 25% 75% St. dev. N
Panel A: Statistics on credit spreads
All 196.7 135.4 87.6 215.9 203.4 24,594
AAA 79.5 74.1 57.5 95.4 27.3 449
AA 78.4 70.5 54.3 93.6 35.9 1,672
A 114.9 100.7 73.0 142.1 60.0 8,029
BBB 181.1 152.4 104.0 210.1 125.0 10,448
BB 384.6 322.9 222.0 455.7 269.9 2,859
B 635.8 537.5 361.2 792.5 372.7 989
CCC 859.3 737.2 470.0 1,211.9 489.1 148
Panel B: Statistics on independent variables
Total assets, $Bn 14.72 6.46 2.95 16.47 33.02 24,315
Cash/Assets 0.039 0.020 0.009 0.048 0.051 24,258
Cash/Net assets 0.044 0.020 0.009 0.051 0.066 24,258
Leverage 0.326 0.298 0.164 0.461 0.198 23,021
Asset volatility 0.233 0.220 0.173 0.276 0.090 22,457
Bond maturity 8.99 7.25 4.55 12.14 6.04 24,496
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41Table VI. Robustness and extensions
The dependent variable is the annualized bond spread in percentage points relative to a cash ow-matched
portfolio of STRIPS, averaged over all outstanding straight bonds for each rm-month observation in the sample.
Regressions (1) to (4) are estimated using OLS. Regressions (5) to (7) are instrumental variable regressions that
use the R&D/Sales ratio of the median rm in the same 3-digit SIC industry each year, as well as the Agency
term, dened as the ratio of CEO's salary and bonus to the value of her equity holdings and options in the
rm, as instruments for Cash/Assets. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book
value of debt and the market value of equity. Asset volatility is the leverage-weighted average of the rm's
one-year historic equity volatility and average bond volatility for the same rating. Model leverage and model
volatility are, respectively, the market value of debt divided by the market value of total assets, and the standard
deviation of market asset returns, estimated from the series of equity prices and book debt values using the
Merton (1974) model. Current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Cash covenant is a
dummy variable that equals one is the rm's bank debt covenants restrict liquidity levels. Regressions (3) and
(7) include a set of dummy variables for the 49 Fama-French industries. Except for regression (4), the sample
consists of monthly observations for nonnancial U.S. rms between December 1996 and December 2003. In
regression (4), the sample consists of nancial U.S. rms over the same period. Standard errors are adjusted for
rm clustering using the Huber/White estimator. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cash/Net assets 3.24*** 3.33*** 3.08*** -1.34*** -3.70** -4.34*** -7.83**
(3.68) (3.87) (3.60) (3.45) (2.05) (2.69) (2.38)
Leverage 6.15*** 5.80*** 6.15*** 2.76***
(14.80) (14.18) (14.79) (4.84)
Asset volatility 6.36*** 6.17*** 4.88*** 6.46***
(9.26) (9.10) (8.02) (4.09)
Model leverage 6.53*** 6.11*** 6.19***
(11.35) (11.75) (12.21)
Model volatility 7.73*** 7.87*** 7.73***
(10.25) (10.41) (10.27)
Log(Assets) -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.25***
(4.87) (5.88) (6.63) (5.75) (4.68) (6.22) (5.66)
Maturity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.98) (1.08) (1.38) (3.13) (4.60) (4.31) (4.54)
Current ratio 0.03 0.04
(0.39) (0.43)
Cash covenant 0.15 -0.09
(0.34) (0.26)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const. -0.04 0.33 0.96** 1.50*** -0.13 0.25 0.83*
(0.08) (0.69) (2.14) (3.09) (0.29) (0.65) (1.96)
N 20596 21527 21346 5384 16801 17654 17508
Adj. R2 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.45 0.53 0.51 0.51Draft 23/10/2007 - 01:00 Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
Table VII. Measures of liquidity in default-predicting models
This table reports quarterly logit regressions of public bond defaults. In regressions (1) and (2) the
dependent variable equals one if the rm defaults within the following scal quarter, and zero otherwise.
In regressions (3) and (4) the dependent variable equals one if the rm defaults in 12 to 15 months, and
zero otherwise. In regressions (5) and (6) the dependent variable equals one if the rm defaults in 36
to 39 months, and zero otherwise. WC is working capital, TA is the book value of total assets, RE is
retained earnings, ME is the market value of equity, TL is the book value of total liabilities, S is sales,
CA is current assets, CL is current liabilities, NI is net income. The sample consists of rm-quarter
observations for non-nancial rms in the sample between December 1996 and December 2003, excluding
post-default. Standard errors are adjusted for rm clustering using the Huber/White estimator. Absolute
values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
1 quarter 1 year 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Altman's (1968) z-score
WC/TA -1.66*** 2.01*** 3.87***
(3.72) (3.74) (5.51)
Cash/TA -0.84 2.21** 5.01***
(0.47) (2.50) (7.03)
(WC-Cash)/TA -1.69*** 1.91*** 2.87***
(3.73) (2.89) (2.97)
RE/TA -0.12 -0.10 -0.30** -0.28* -0.50*** -0.37***
(1.13) (0.99) (2.11) (1.86) (4.28) (2.72)
EBIT/TA -2.52** -2.45** -1.93*** -1.90*** -0.88 -0.54
(2.10) (2.02) (4.38) (4.20) (1.48) (0.73)
ME/TL -5.22** -5.19** -1.38*** -1.39*** -0.28 -0.34
(2.51) (2.49) (2.62) (2.63) (1.44) (1.59)
S/TA 0.19 0.22 -2.67*** -2.60** -0.80 -0.28
(0.39) (0.47) (2.77) (2.53) (0.96) (0.39)
Const. -2.78*** -2.83*** -3.49*** -3.51*** -4.91*** -5.01***
(6.23) (5.79) (10.89) (10.42) (17.24) (18.38)
N 17950 17945 17950 17945 17950 17945
Adj R2 0.32 0.32 0.09 0.09 0.045 0.049
Zmijewski's (1984) model
CA/CL -0.05 0.03* 0.08***
(0.76) (1.68) (4.00)
Cash/CL -0.21 0.04* 0.08***
(1.28) (1.84) (3.86)
(CA-Cash)/CL -0.00 0.02 0.11
(0.06) (0.32) (1.42)
NI/TA -4.33*** -4.33*** -1.71*** -1.73*** -0.00 0.24
(4.06) (4.04) (3.15) (3.12) (0.00) (0.25)
TL/TA 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.16*** 1.17***
(3.38) (3.37) (4.61) (4.59) (4.53) (4.59)
Const. -6.36*** -6.35*** -5.79*** -5.77*** -6.09*** -6.13***
(15.51) (15.68) (30.02) (28.02) (27.83) (25.62)
N 21627 21568 21627 21568 21627 21568
Adj R2 0.11 0.11 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.022
43Draft 23/10/2007 - 01:00 Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
Table VIII. Regressions of changes in cash holdings
This table reports the results of regressions of annual changes in cash holdings, dened as (Casht  
Casht 1)=Assetst 1. Regressions in columns (1) and (2) are estimated for the whole sample. Regressions
in columns (3) to (7) group rms by their senior unsecured rating at the beginning of the period (at time
t 1). Rating change is a the dierence in notches between the rm's ratings at the end and the beginning of
the year, where AAA is coded as 1, AA+ as 2, AA as 3, etc. Cash ow is earnings before depreciation and
amortization net of interest, less taxes and common dividends. Market to book is the book value of assets
less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by book assets. Log(Assets) is the
logarithm of the total book assets in millions of dollars. Expenditures is the capital expenditures over total
book assets. Acquisitions is acquisitions spendings over total book assets. NWC is the dierence between
current assets net of cash and current liabilities. Short-term debt is debt in current liabilities over total book
assets. All these variables are measured at year-end t. Standard errors are adjusted for rm clustering using
the Huber/White estimator. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked
***, **, and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance level, respectively.
All rms AAA-AA A BBB BB B-CCC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rating change 0.10** 0.11** -0.03 0.22 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.06
(2.38) (2.51) (0.08) (1.13) (3.25) (3.17) (0.98)
Cash ow 11.30*** 14.91*** 18.99* 12.42*** 9.68*** 19.37*** 15.61***
(10.14) (11.32) (1.91) (3.75) (3.23) (5.26) (9.21)
Market to book 0.16 0.45*** 0.32 0.36* 0.56*** 0.62*** 0.72***
(1.31) (4.39) (1.21) (1.75) (4.25) (2.84) (2.83)
Firm size 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.27 0.04 0.12** 0.09 0.56***
(5.37) (2.83) (1.28) (0.83) (2.52) (1.54) (5.68)
Expenditures -6.64*** -11.58 -8.94** -5.35*** -9.55*** -5.77***
(6.17) (1.63) (2.39) (3.00) (5.19) (3.54)
Acquisitions -7.93*** -7.34 -4.30** -8.56*** -8.24*** -9.25***
(8.39) (0.81) (2.01) (5.06) (6.04) (5.25)
 NWC -12.18*** -35.65 -15.67*** -8.71*** -13.27*** -12.28***
(9.91) (1.08) (4.32) (3.21) (5.48) (6.91)
 Short debt 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00***
(2.48) (0.78) (1.71) (2.01) (2.84) (2.96)
Const. -1.89*** -1.20*** -3.08 -0.89 -1.44*** -1.37** -4.48***
(6.19) (4.00) (1.15) (1.35) (2.99) (2.27) (5.96)
N. 19227 17038 355 1976 4312 4065 6175
R2 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07
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Figure 1. Cash holdings by rating
This graph shows mean and median cash holdings of rms by their senior unsecured rating.
Ratings are reported using the S&P convention, by notch (AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, etc.).
Cash/Net assets is cash divided by total book assets net of cash.
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